












/ 





'. 






Ott tAUHANUt uil-l ViVi 
rWECLASSIFICATiON FILE 


DECLASSIFIED 
SEE EXCHANGE & GIFT DiV. 


u 

ssGimf/bv Frmi) 


OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES 
Research and AnalvaiB Branch 


.For-' ttfr e —of S« 
ofTl oi ai - y- o nJ bys 


M 



CLASSltlUAXIOa 


R & A No« 5359 



COKTRIBUTIORS OF ITALY TOWARD THE AII.IED WAR 


(Preliminary Report) 


Description 

A recapitulation of the forms and 
extent of Italian assistance to the 
Allied war effort in Europe during 
the period of Italian co-belligcreaoy, 
October 1943 to May 1945o 


Washington 


31 August 1946 


ov 0 X 1 uuttutnorizea person is prohibited by law. 



secret/control 


17 


Copy No 








1 «•> 


r 


4 



• If 


I 








\ 


\ 


4 


I 


I 





i 

I 


I 


4 







* 



JLi4 

A * 






« 


fl i/n'r 


. Ik^ < 





SECRET 



V'^ 


o 


Sxmc^ry 


Ao The political contributiono of the Italian govemnent and people 
are to be found in: (a) their acceptance of the continuance of the 
Armistice regime during the war; (b) their maintenance of a social and 
political atmosphere in which no sorious threat to the security of 
Allied military operations arose; (c) their willingness to mobilize 
Italy’s remaining economic and manpower resources behind the vm.r 
effort at the expense of finding real aolutione to urgent problems of 
national rocenstruction. 

Bo Despite serious limitations ■ahich Allied policy (and Italy’s 
poverty) long ixi 5 ) 08 ad on her direct military participation in the war, 
the Italian Navy, Army, Air Force, and partisan movement all provided 
valuable and indispensable support to Allied military operations in 
the Mediterranean theater. The messaire of this contribution is to be 
found in the number of lives of Allied troops ti^us saved and in immense 
saving of time, shipping, and max^ov/er which the Allies would have had ' 
to expend had Italian cooperation not been so spontaneous. 

C. Italy’s economic contribution to the winning of the war is embodied 
in; (a) her acceptance of the increased inflation loaded upon a nearly 
exliausted national economy by the injection of millions of dollars worth 
of AMG occupation money into Italian currency circulation; (b) by ne- 
cessarily restricted ex{)ort8 of fruits emd chemical products to oertain*^^ 
Allied nations; (o) by en estimated saving of^lCX),000 tons of Allied 


JO 


SECRET 












r 
I i*‘ 


■i, • .i 


t.k 


ft 

T 

* '• 


H 


ff 


STJR 

,X'.' V 


. 1 . 




f' 


; t 


1 I 

J t 


'PS 


I i 


1 ». 


«• t 


*: . . ' '■’I' 

4 {"{V 

* ‘ .**' i 

■ *.* »■'. i,“'-’ f> 


V 

I 




»» 


/'« -> j 


'T 

1 


•'» Sj 

» 

•i.'* 


•^ -Jc 

V > 




1 ^‘. 


7 




* 

'.t 

V fc-’” 


” •* ^ 


'•' k'* 4 1 


■e* 


•» o 


^ ■ 


•»# 


St'’ 






i > 




) • 


■Ab- 


• ^ > 

»*■ ft ■< j 


A« 


f .• 


' eMOtl’ 


7 f 

' b. 


\ ’ 


.'Pr 










F> 

SJ*.-. 




. V- ' 


“fis' 




:\ 


' •- *■ 

* * r 


t» V 4i > 


I > -4» 




i 


# 


.• 


ili 


4 I 






4 








SECRET 


shipping mad© possible by Allied procurement in Italy of large 
amounts of goods and services; (d) by the acceptance of the long 
continuance of a standard of living for the people well below i^at 
it had been even under German occupation, and considerably below 
what is generally regarded as necessary to preserve minimum standards 
of health ^d efficiency* 


/ 


SRCRP.T 








SECRET 


CONTRIBUTIONS OF ITALY TOT/ARD THE ALLIED V:AR EFFORT 

A. Politioal Contributions of the Italian (ro-yernment 

The reconstruction of the Italian state on a democratic basis, 
and the recovery of independence and respectability, have been, since 
the Armistice, alon^ with liberation of the national territory, a- 
paramconit consideration of the several anti-Fascist parties which 
have been in the Italian sovemment since the formation of the third 
Bado^lio cabinet in late April 1944. For the Allies, Italy's demo¬ 
cratic reconstruction has been both a war and a post-war aim; but so 
long as the fighting lasted, a mor© iramodiate and purely military 
Allied concern was the maintenance of e. political and social atmosphere 
in vhich the free movement and functioning of their military units and 
personnel coiild be carried on without fear of either hostile or obstruct¬ 
ive action by the population. The Allied (Control) Commission v/as 
established in Italy to relieve the Allied theater command from the 
direct responsibility for securing full observance by the Italians of 
the terms of the Armistice and to mobilize the Italian economy as fully 
as possible in support of the war effort. That these wartime, military 
exigencies of the Allies wore, on the whole, mor® than adequately met 
is a political achievement for ?/hich the successive Badoglio, Bonomi, 
and Parri governments, and the various political parties wiiich took 
the lead in national life after Fascism, deserve credit. Though each 
of those prime ministers, at times, chafed under and protested against 
some of the harsher and more devitalizing torms of the Armistice, this 
v;as understandable enough from a government seeking to regain a greater 


SECRET 












« 2 - 


SECRKT 


measure of independence in its ov*ti affairs and therefore a stronger 
position of confidence and popularity with its own people. 

Over a period of nearly two years the successive Italian govern¬ 
ments have maintained faith with the Allies in keeping the Armistice 
of 29 September a secret; they bowed repeatedly to Allied interpreta¬ 
tions of that Armistice even when it meant putting themselves in a 
weaker position before their people. The very gradual relaxation of 
Allied control was more or less gracefully accepted by the Salerno 
and Romo governments which presented to the Italian people their many 
failures to win particular concessions from the Allies in such a way 
as to prevent the stirring up of anti-Alliod feeling or agitation. 

Viihile it is true that the Italian government recognised that 
Italy’s recovery depended largely on Allied willingness to extend 
them increasing aid and syn^athy, tliia does not mean that they were 
always boxmd to yield unqueationingly to Allied bidding. They knew 
that their own resisteaaco, at some points, to Allied demands mi^t 
have induced the latter to consider repressive measures in the country- 
at-large which ViTould, if carried out, have been injurious to the mili¬ 
tary interests of the Allies since it would have wasted needed manpov/ar 
in police activities. Or, again, there were times when the government 

(as during the long delay in securing Allied recognition of the first 

1 

Bonomi govomiMnt after the fall of Rome,, could have refused to accept 
further responsibility for attempting to reconstruct the country 
politically, leaving the task of governing Italy entirely in the hands 
of the Allies at a time when the latter could hardly afford to see 


1. OSS source SN, 14 and 15 June 1944 


SECRET 











« 3 


SECnST 


Italian affairs drift back into the state in v:hich they had been 
before the entrance of the anti-fascist political parties into the 
governments That such embarrassing, and possibly damaging, develop¬ 
ments did not materialize is evidence of the political good sense of 
the various parties in the government (including those of the extreme 
Left)o It may also be considered as an index of the sincere desire of 
the great majority of Italy's anti-fascist leaders to put themselves 
as much in harmony as possible v/ith Allied fundamental principles of 
action (political and international) not merely as a ivar-time policy, 
but on a permanent basiso 

The Italian government, beset by economic and social problems of 
staggering proportions as well as by fierce inter-party rivalry from 
within, (largely the legacy of the Fascist catastrophe), doubtless fell 

far short of an ideal performance by Allied standards. However, if 
on© compares the policy of the Itelian government and people toward 
the Germans, with that followed toi/ard the Allies, the magnitude of 
Italy's political contribution is more easily realized. The Italian 
Government: (a) maintained a positive degree of unity in the war 

effort with the Allies among a 

previously demoralized end nearly desperate people; (b) accepted a 
progrossivsly lower, alnost dangerously low, standard of living for 
the Italian people in order to satisfy tho Allied occupation needs and 
to speed the liberation of tho eouitryj (o) preserved, on the v*ole, a 
ooimnendable degree of public order (without adequate police, oonmunioa- 
tions, or transport), at least ia tho sense that demonstrations or 
activity which might have hindered Allied military operations were 
almost completely avoided, and labor strikes comparable to those in 
German-occupied Italy simply did not occur while the fighting lastedi 









- 4 - 


SECRET 


(d) Rcceptad, unhappily but without ni£.lica, long-continued Allied 
limitations on Italy's military participation in ‘tho war,, and Allied 
exactions v/hich badly strained the nation's already shaky financial 
situation, even when no inmodiato propects of political ra-i^rds to 
Italy were in sight; (e) consistently followed a publicity and national 
propaganda program designed to securo public acceptance of the necessity 
of subordinating the settlement of fundamental political and socio^* 
econoiiic problems (e.go the "institutional question," agrarian and 
industrial reforms, etc.) to the iznmediate needs of the Allied war 
effort and of the liberation c-f Italian territory. These are v/hat 
may be viewed as tome of the political contributions of the Italian 
government and people to the achievement of final victory. 

It is undoubtedly true that Italisn cooperation xvi'ch the Allies, 
in the political as in the military and: economic spheres, was fvmda- 
mentally motivated by considerations of Italian national interest. 

It is also true that Italian spokesmen have been peculiarly adept in 
placing both the achievements and the limitations of Italian assist¬ 
ance in the most favorable light from Ihe viewpoint of future Italo- 
Allied relations. These considerations do not, however, detract from 
the vory real advantages whioh have accrued to the Allies as a result 
of tho basic community of Italian end Allied aims since October 1943* 


SECRET 







- 5 


SECRET 


^“ 2£ ions Italian Arniod Forces 

1«. Contribution of the Italian Army. 

’ I^Qori‘ 2 ;aniza.tion of the Italian Army after 8 Sep tamber 1943« 

Yihen Italy eurrendored to the Allises in September 1945 the Italian 
Army v.as in a state of complete disintogration<. The troops themselves 
were scattered from one end of Italy to the other, in addition to those 
in the Balkans, and southern France. Many of the officers had been 
captured and the men were deserting in largo nuiDbera. During the con¬ 
fused period immediately after tbs Armistice, the Germans were able 
to disarm and take prisoner large numbers of Italian troops whose 
leaders had abandoned them or lacked the coiirage to act on their 
responsibilityc 

Cut of this chaos and confusion the Italian Ministry of '/iar and 

the General Staff, with the aid cf the Allied Commission’s sub-commission 

for lend forces, created an army wMch at the end of hositilitieg in 

Italy nuLiberod 500,000 men end v/hich, according to the Juno 1945 report 

of the Allied.Commission, made "inestimable contributions” to tiie Allied 

v/ar offoi’t both ae regards maintenance of the Allied lines of cornmunica- 

1 

tion end the final assault on the Hazi lines in Italy, 

Soon after tho Armistice, regimento of the regular Italian army 
v;or© reorganized and becairo knowr early in 1944 as tho Italian Libera¬ 
tion Corps. Lacking modern equipment and weapons and with scsjity moans 
of transport at its disposal, this corps reached the front in December 

1943 end soon aftorFjards elicited praise for its courageous end”victori- 

2 

ous action" from General Mark Clark. Within three months after the 

1. European Kows Digest, 12 Jiino 1945; OSS CID #98154, 22 August 44. 

2. OV.I: Itali^n ^3evjs'~Bulle tin , 12 t^feiy 1944. 


SECRET 











s 


I . 





I 


4 tm* 


T 

4 


k 


• t 


I 


H air* 














/ 




F 





f 



. « 




t 


t. 


*v 




\ 


, ai- 


r“ tr ' 



k« 


f 


« 

*»V. *ip 


A 


- 


|E~ 




-w 


^ 


r- 


-^J 




• • 



4 


I'l 



•^.;r 




4 


\ 


•f • 

» <* 



♦ 





'*-»;*• 


*■ 


a- 


i 


4 * 


I 


> 


\ 



I 



1 



6 


SECRET 


Armistice, units of the new Italian army were "indispensable" in per¬ 
mitting the Allied military effort to be carried out smoothly and in 

guarajitealng security both to the Allied rear areas and to the civilian 
1 

population. 

As a consequenco of the success of this corps and the work of the 

au::iliary units in July 1944, and in response to pressure’ from Italians 

that they be given an opportunity to fight in the front linos and thus 

contribute to a greater extent to the Allied war effort, the Allies 

2 

finally gave their consent to uho formation of six combat groups. 

Four of these groups, the first of v/hich was ready for combat on 

3 October 1944, v/ere cosiposed largely of recent conscripts and pre- 

armistice Italian divisions while tho other two groups (Folgore and 

Legnano) were made up of manbers of the Liberation Corps which had 

been v/ithdrawn from the front in August 1944, 

bo Statements of Allied military officers- and Allied leader so 

Tributoiwas paid on 22 August 1944', to the Italian Liberation Corps 

and tVie new Italian army as a whole by Major General Langley Brovming, 

head of the Allied Commiseion’s land forces sub^coramission, v/ho said 

that he did not think many realised how well the Italians had done in 

organizing out of chaos an army of over 300,000o Referring to the 

Italian Liberation Corps as a group that had "fought well" and had 

sustained many casualties, he praised tho troops working behind the 

lines who had "cooperated loyally as co-belligerents with practically 
3 

no fuss or friction," 

1. 07?I: European Nows Digest, 12 June 1945; AC Land Forces Sub-CoTumission 
report for Juno^ 

2. R & A Report No, 1112.99, 8 January 1945, 

3. OSS CID #93154, 22 August 1944. 


SECRET 










SECRET 


« ? 


Irv addition to coiniitendation froiri the Allied Goinoiissi on^ the 

Italian Amy has had its shtire of praise from Allied oornnanders on 

the Italian fronto Action of th© Italian Liberntioa Corps v.hich 

fou|;ht at McniP L^ingo brought 7/ords of praise from General Mark Clark 

v^o df'.scribed it as en action prcTinj- ^the detenrdnation of th© Italian 

1 

soldiers to liberate their country from German dominatior.^ Almost a 

year Is-.tor, in Febimsry 1945, General Clark referred to tho Italian 

army sis a fore© whose contribution to the Allied imr ©ffert had .al~ 

2 

read^/ boon important and 'R^aa incroas:ng in iraporteco every day,. 

Field i^rsha). Alexander, in congratulating the Italian combat 

groups operating with the Eighth Armj.r, declared that in Ms opinion 

Italy Tvac ”completely vindicated from th© day vrhen she became a Co¬ 
's 

beiligercnt and began a loyjil fight on the Allied side-” Cn another. 

occtisicn Field Marshal Alexander hailed the Italian arm/ as one of 

his ’’victorious'’ armies euid praised specifically the Creri.ona unit 

whichp with tho support of the Patriots, .had achieved "groat .success” 

in its first important action against tho Germans, reaching all its 

4 

objectives and capturing eeveral hundred prisoners- 

Not only Allied military loaders in close contact with the Italian 

Army have considered its contributiozi creditable, but aifso Prime Minister 

Churchill in a speech in the House of Com-nons on 24 May 1944 described 

tho Italian forces as having "played tiieir part in tho line on more 
5 

theji one occasion," Later on, in August 1944 ha said tiiat tho Italians 


1* OAIs Eur'^peem Hev/s Digest, 12 Jixae 1P45- 
2, Ibid a ,“^7“ February 1^157^ 

3o OSS source D, 23 June 1945o 

4o OiO;: Italian Ne^/s Bullstin, 19 /4arch 1945o 

6o Parliamentary Debates, 24 Eay 194-1, Voio 400, No- 82 


SECRE*! 










I» 


u 


•i y 




\ 


WEBr * 




-' Ir 


* < * 




|4m«f • > 








%>fi» 


: I 4 




•fr* 


.1 . f 




1 

t 


*“■ 1 © •! 


**aB' ‘ I 









4 ^ 


% ‘i 


V ♦ ’ ‘ 


. ► ' 


v 


i * ..* 1 -' 


« 


tit'.|i ‘ 7* 


I'-r* 




i f 


7 ^9 . 


* I 


!0 ' 


or 


•• 9 


V» j i {* 


P 


' 


• 5 f.« 


.T> 

— V—» _ 


.•ot.i. 


r -4 




p -/i- '* 


- ■ '■'■*-v» 1 

^ • 


I 


”1 . • * '*■ 


f 





•> 



*■* iiy-^ i 

;^ger«» 




ll 




M.»r 





«...i 










■vj 


M 


liti. 



/• «. -Si 





4 .U. -T-- 






i '• l-i • 


:Sh 





I i 











SiilCIililT 


o. 8 - 

were ’’fighting v/sll" and that tho siz© of thoir army woiaI i bo increased. 

The Allied Commission’s cub-coamission for land forces also praised 

Count Oasati, Minister of War, whose "good leadership and efforts" in 

conjunction v;i-&h the General Staff and the Allied Ccinniieslon made 

2 

possible the Army's swift cuad efficient reorganization. 

Oo Records of Italian troops on ooiEbgt duty. Italian oombat 

servico covers the period from Decomber 194S to liay 1945, The Italian 

Liberation Corps began training in Puglie shortly after tie Armistice 

and, after oTercoming serious difficulties due to lack of equipment 

and v/eapens, v/ent to the front in December 1943 under the command of 

the United States Fifth Army. This force of about 20,030, composed of 

infantry.'-, Bersaglieri^ Alpine troops, paratroops and artillery, fought 

the enemy for th© first true at Ivlonte Lungo and suffered severo losses^ 

After four months in th© front lines it was transferred to the oonimand 

of the Eighth Army and took part on 31 March 1944 in the action which 

led to the capture of Monte Maron©. The Reinbo division of paratroopers, 

after months of static 'warfare and patrol action, captured Filottrano 

S 

(Marche) with a loss of 300 meno 

In August 1944 the Liberation Corps was withdrawn from the front 
and organization cf the six combat groups (about 9,000 mei each) 7.^,8 
begun. Th© first (Cremona) of these coinbe.t groups, compiotely re¬ 
organized, equipped and trained in the us© of British weapons and 
methods, went to the front under the oommfind of the Eighth Army at 

York Time s, 3 August 1944. 

2o (AVIT ^ E uropean ITews Digest, 12 Juno 1945. 

3. Ibid. 


SECRET 















* 9 - 


SECR3T 


th 0 end of 1944, five montho after its formation* 3y March 1945,, 
four groups wero at the front and the Cremona group had already 
scored successes in an attack south of the Po di Primaro where oTer 
200 Germans wero captured. The fifth group, Mantova, was ready to 
join in the fighting whsn tho Germans surroJidorecU All four of the 
groups (Cremona, Friuli, Lej^ieno ^ind Folgoro) took part in the final 
large scale attack. The Friuli lost 500 men in on attack near Bologna 
and units of the Legnano were among the first to enter the city. The 
Cremona group which pursued the enemy beyond the 6atomo River was 
commendod by tho commander of the British Fifth Corps foi tl'ie effi¬ 
ciency with which it accon^lished its task (uid the great courage and 

1 

seal sho^vn by its officers during the last fighting. 

d, Italian service troops. Besides the troops on combat duty 

a much Ic.rger army of auxiliary and service troops (about 250,000) 

wore operating in ttie rear of the front lines. Detaclimerts of these 

men worked on roads, harbor installations, cleared ’nines, and main- 

2 

tained Allied linos of communication. Major General Brewuing, in 

his report of 22 August 1944, praised these troops, toe, for the 

imfiienso task thoy had accomplishod in ropairixig communications, and 

3 

engaging in all manner of v/ork which saved Allied mAnpovrer. 

e. Casualties suffered . Casualties sustained by the Italian 
arm^^ at tho front and behind the lines bet^voen 8 Septeniber 1943 and 
SO April 1945 wore published in June by the Italian. VJar Linistry. 

1* ©WX: European Hews Digest, 12 June 1945^ 

2. Ibid o 

3. OSS CID ^98154, 22 August 1944. 

SEtlRST 






I • 


# 







V 


/ 


t 


t 




1 






% 


• I 




4 

# 


V 




ft 




* 












I 


ft 


% 




% 




I' 


1 


ft f 




• * ft ft 

« 


I 


ft 


I 



4 


ft 


ft 


ft 







\ 







% 


% 





s 


% 


ft 


ft 


'ft 



», 


« 


ft 


t 


ft 


ft 


ft 


ft 


i 


t 


* > 


• • \ 



ft 


ft 


r 


t , 

ft 


• 4 


I 


V 


I 


ft 


* • 






% 


ft 


ft 


/ 


^ •• 


I 


ft 


ft 


•s 

ft 


V 


ft 



ft 






» 


r 





b 




« 

/■ 


• » < 


/ 


t 




V 


fc • 

» 

% 




A 


« 


• • 




I 


» 


/ 


ft 


4 





- 10 - 


SECHET 


1 

The list totals 17,474 killed, 9,363 wounded, and 17,647 jnissingb 

The Llinistry of IV&r points out specifically that these figures do 

not include losses of the Legnano group or of Tarious auxiliary 

units vjhioh took part in the final battle for tho liberation of the 

north, 'fhese figures raay, theroforo, be considerably lower than tho 

actual losses during the period mentioned. 

fo Italian prisoners of v^ar . the prisoners of war in Italy 

have also apparently mad© ei’-ary effort to contribute to th© Allied 

war effort. According to Liouteneuit Colonel J.A* Campbell, head of 

the Vvar Material Disposal and Prisonor of ?/ar sub-coramiseion of AC, 

prisoners of \yar have "volunteejred*^ for any kind of work except a.ctual 
2 

combat while a high official of the War Department is reported to 

have said that the greater part of tl^ prisoners in tho bnited States 

\Toro engaged in "indispensable work” connected with th© war 

3 

effort. Similai' statements have appeared in th© British press* 


1* FCO: Ticker, 11 June 1945 
Killed 

Combat groups T ^,621 
Sumller units 
under direct 
Anglo-Amcricon 
cora'iiand 1,233 

Isolated fighting 421 
Air-raids 470 

Other sorvice d uty 729 

Totals 17,474 


Italian Ai-my Casualties 

Wounded 

llissing 

609 

177555 “ 


3,549 

639 

198 


709 


2,233 

6 

9,363 

17,647 


2. OSS CID #97536, 22 August 1944. 

3. OSS source D, 7 July 1946, 


SECRET 











$ 


« 



I 


t/ 




• * 


% 





t • 




» 




I 


1 


4 

• * 


4 • 

4 


■ • 





4 


t 


n 








I 


■ 




\ 






> 


t : 



)M > 






- 11 - 


SECRET 


g. SI?.i (Ser^iaio Informagione LUlitare), T-lilitary Intalli" 
goace > The Italian I^lilitary Intelligence also contributed its share 
to the Allied war offorb. Allied intelligenoo agencies considered 
the serrioo it rendered to the Allied cause "extroniely valuable” and 

1 

described the agency as "an invaluable adjunct" to their ov;n agencies. 

h. Italian^ milit(3iry policy . It seems clear that, confronted 
with almost insurmountable odds, the Italian War Idinistry and all those 
responsible for the Army's reorganisation (including the anti-Eascist 
parties which spurred the government on taie course) did ©vorthing in 
their powor to increase the contribution of the array to the Allied war 
effort» In addition, both the Committee of National Liberation and 
the political parties bnclcoi up "tho Covomment's call-up of the 1914 
to 1924 classes, in January 1945, ^jurging men to report for duty to 

aid in the Allied war effort and Italy's final liberation from the 
Kaais. Most groups, however, and particularly Arn^ officers and parti¬ 
sans, are reported to have felt that the contribution of the Army could 
have been much greater had the Allies permitted tlie Italians a larger 
fighting force at the front. Throughout the v/ar, Italian leaders in 
the government and in the parties never ceased to agitate this issue 
with the Allies. 


1. OSS CID #104252, 15 Noven&er 1944* 


SECRET 










1 


II 



4 






\ 

s 




4 


I 






f 




I 


* 




I 



t 


L 




I 


r 




•% 



1 


I 


S 


% 


» 

I 


« 


1 


* 


« 









4 







f 

I 




« 4 


♦ ^ 


•r 

• ^ 






. f 


* ■.• 




I 


•V 


♦ 


% 


; 


« 


«. 


4 


f 


1 > - 






• . 



» 


t 


p 




/ 


# 


i 


p 


I 


r • 


i 



I 




4 




s 



I 


* 




T 


* • 



' # 


I 



I 





4 


J 










« 



4 










♦ 

4 i» 




• ‘ » » 


t 



♦ 





* 


• • 


» 


« 


1 


I 



-ti 


f ^ 


* . 



1 









« 


■ 


‘f 




t 

•» 

i» •» ^ * 


» 


« 


» 









« 


^ -* 



* 




« 

■« 



t 


• I 


t 


4 



( 






* 


« 


«• 


4- 


4 



III! 

i 




4 



* 






•« 


I 




y 


./ 




> 


I f 


* f ‘ 

3 


I 



i 


4 


I 


i 


i 


{4U^ 


r 


, t 
r . 





- 12 


SECRET 


2- Ccmtrlbution of the Italian Navy ; 

Strategic v^luo to the Allies of the Italian Fleet » At th© 
time of th© Italian surrender under the Arniistic© officially announced 
by General Eisenhower on 8 September 1943, th© situation and attitude 
of the Italian Navy wero regarded by tho Allies as one of the main keys 
to the global strategic picture* Thou^i it had suffered heeruy losses 
and was already largely neutralised as a dangerous threat to Allied 
naval control of th© liediterranesn, it v/as still a substantial "fleet in 
in being.” To keep it so neutralized” would have required the retention 
of considerable heavy Allied mival units in the T-fediterranean at a time 
i-yhen the fortunes of war in the Pacific badly required their presence 
there* British prime minister Churchill recognised this clearly in a 
message to the House of Commonn on 9 September 1844« Ke pointed out 
that almost the ontire Italian surface fleet, along with many merchant 
ships and S'ibmarines, hod loyally observed the Armistice and, under 
desperate Hazi air attack, which sank the battleship Roroa with all 
hands, had reached Allied bases* Churchill made tho strategic judg¬ 
ment that "these acts have altered, in a decisive manner, tho balance 

i 

of naval power in th© vrorld*" In other words the decision of the 
Italian Naval Command to bring th© fleet over immediately to the Allies 
(they could have refused to recognize Cadoglio’s authority and might 
have allov/ed the fleet to fall into German hands or themselves have 
put the ships effectively but of commiseion) had on immodiat© e\ feet 
on th© development of Allied strategy not only in the llediterranesin 

1. SpGoch to Parliament of 9 Soptoniber 1943. 


SECRET 









i . . 





t 




« 





% 


t 



t. 




i 


J 



* 




\ 







t 


1 • ; 



a 




* 


■ 


4 


t 

t ' 


« 





' ,4 




4 

*4 


•t 5 j , 


I 

i 



4 


\ 


4 


4 


\ 


% 


ft 


i 




■ » 


4 


\ 

2 







* 


/ 


4 


M 











# 


r 


4 


t 






t 


4 



« 




I • 






H . 

4 


( 




ft 


^ ♦. 


4 






ft 


/ 



4 




ft 


I 


f 


4 


4 


4 4 


\ * 


» 




i 


4 


V 


ft 


• -• 


< 



' 4 


ft 


ft 


f 


* rf 

t 


« 


4 

% 

4 


4 


« 


» 


ft 




4 


I 



ft 


i 


— 13 -• 


SECRET 


but also in the Pacifico Admiral Cunninghamj Allied Kaval Commander 
in the Mediterranean^ in September 1943, (and since) and President 

T 

Roosorelt also, have confirmed Churchill’s evaluation of the importance 

to the Allied cause, globally, of the determined and spontaneous action 

1 

of the Italian Havy in putting itself Immodlately into Allied hands* 
b. First steps in Italian ITavy vi&v activity for the Alliss, 

Vi^ithin a month after the Italian surrender, the Badoglio goternment 
had declared ■ssar on Germany and attained for Italy the status of a 
co-belligerent with the Allies. By the end of February 1944, the 

i r ' 

Italian fleet was participating in the war, relioving Allied naval 
forces of some of the strain of convoy duty in the Mediterranean, 
transporting also laoa and materiel in support of Allied land operations 
in the theater. All types of naval units up to and including cruisers 
apparently participated in th^s© operations. The Italian Havy Ministry 

Cj 

was able to publish figures showing that in the first five months 
of co-beiligorency Italian naval units had escorted 173 Allied convoys 
totalling 2,64-4 ships and more than 21,000,000 tons, and had trans¬ 
ported about 9,000 Allied and 93,000 Italian troops. Tiiough the 

l 

imaards of such convoy-escort duty had become less than they had been 

earlier in the xvar, such du'iy was evidently performed not only v/illingly 

but efficiently, so that gradually ail available end suitable Italian 

fleet units were drawn into some fonn of activity of value to Allied 

S 

land or naval operations. Little immediate use v/as mad© of the five 

1. Hew York Times, 12 September 1944; Wash ing ton Post, 18 September 
1944 (From President Roosevelt’s message to Congress). 

2'. R&A Ho. 1112.52, 25 Mextih 1944* 

S. OSS GID #P-245, 17 Februax'y 19453 OSS source T, 20 August 1945. 


SECRET 












l 


f 




I 

r 


\ 




0* 



-. V } 

• ♦ 

i ; ■ I 

• , • t • I ■; 

< 1 , • ■ 

) ^ ■ r . 


I 



« 







* 

i 



» 


« 


« 



1 • » 



• t 


-l t 

"i 

j 


fh 



4 

t 

t 


9 



f • 


4 




f 


I 







I 


4 

















( 






« 


r 


* 


4 






1 


t 


i 







> l 



« 


% 


« 


# 


9 


9 

4 


4 









4 


‘ ^ - 

» 







\ • 



• i 


r 






« 


« 




1 


4 


4 


« 



« 


« 


• • 


« 








{ 




w 


♦ 


♦ 


4 

.4 # 


• • 


* 



% 


/ 


4 




i 


f 


< 

‘Mk 

ft ^ 


> 



I 


a. 



- 14 - 


SECRET 


available Italian battleships^ in part to toohnibal difficulties 

?fhioh the Allies would have found in keeping them supplied vdth th© 
particular siaes and types of munitions which their combat use re¬ 
quired, cuid in port to the insufficient anti-aircraft protection, 
in guns and armor plate, and to other lacks in technical, secret 
devices of Allied development, which characterized the Italian 
capital ships. Generally speaking, th© typos of duty which the 
Allies opened up to the Italian Havy did not call for units of 

battleship size except for limited us© in training or gunnery 
i 

probleme. 

c. Types of duty and missions assigned to Italien units. In 

the middle of February 1945, British Rear-Admiral C.E. Morgan (head 

2 

of the Naval sub-commission of the Allied Commission) reported to the 
AC on the activities of the Italian fleet since the Armistice. Re . 
said tiiat it hs.d ’’co-operated to the fullest possible extent” with 
the Allied authorities, subject, of course, to the limitations im¬ 
posed at the surrender, and to the ability of the Allies and the 
Italian government to provide facilities for modernization and repair. 
Admiral Llorgan reported that the Italian fleet’s six serviceable 
czniisors and eight destroyers v/er© being constantly used and were 
v/orking "iiarder in the Allied oauso then they ever did for the A>ds.** 

Up to the end of 1944, the Admiral’s report shov/ed, the relief afforded 
to Allied shipping was summed up in th© following figures showing v/hat 

1, OSS CID fP-246, 17 February 1946; OSS source T, 20 August 1945. 

2. Ibid, 


SECRET 






f 


I 



» 


< 



t 


V 


• I 


» 



} 


.1 

I 


> 




0 




1 “ • 




> 


> 







• J 





* 







» 







t 




•w 






• . 






» 


« 





t 




» 




» 


> 






t 










I 




V 


% 


f 











? 










I 


« 



/ 


t 



\ 




• > 



s 




I 


r 


« 



•> 



< 




✓ 


f 



- 16 - 


SECRET 


tho Italian Kav^' had been doing: 

(1) It had transported 210,000 Allied personnel* 

(2) It had moved 57,000 tons of stores* 

(S) It had escorted 1,170 convoys containing 9,300 ships, 
and had steamed a total of 1,600,0<.0 miles* 

1 

An earlier report of Admiral LTorgan to the Allied (Control) 
Commission describes the convoy and escort v/ork (with the loss of 
only t'-vo out of 5,000 ships escorted) f?diich had become the principal 
duty of tho 30 to 40 torpedo boats and corvettes which were available 
at any given time. Of the 32 submarines which were preserved, about 
22 were generally available. Soma of these v/ere used for training 
.and ©xporimental work in connection with Allied submarine and anti¬ 
submarine warfare training programs. This vjork Involving Italian 
underwater craft, v^ith officers and cre\vs, was carried bn in the 

Italian theater, and at American or British bases in Bermuda or in 
2 

the Par East. Italian submarines also, along with surface "small 

boats" of the MAS, and torpodo boat types, carried out a number 

of in 5 >ortaat and dangerous rrlceions, or special operations in the 

Adriatic* Sudi missions usually consisted of: the landing of agents 

in enemy territory, ^landing reconnaissance parties and supplies, and 

tho rescue of escaped prisoners of ^var or the evacuation of personnel 

3 

which had boon v/orking behind the enemy lines. Allied naval authori¬ 
ties list 151 such "missions", of which 132 were carried out with 
complot© success. The official Allied report ascribes the lack of 

success in tho case of the other 19 missions as having "nothing to 
/ 


1. OSS CID #98154, 22 August 1344. 

2. OSS source T, 20 August 1945. 

3. OSS CiD #98154, 22 August 1944. 




r 


u 


« 




f 

V 





«>•) 

V 


\ 

I 

f 


4 



» • 


t- 


■ 




4 


* 


• 4 


t 

J 



« 





t 


4 




9 


t 


f 


» 


4 


fC 




/■ 




S' 





» 




I 


# 


4 


» 


* 


-t 




f 


0 






I 



I 


* 


* 


p- 


» 


4 


I 


4 « 


« 








I 


« 








4 


> •• 


% 


/ 


* 




t 


% 


4 



ft 


ft 




i. 

ft 


4 



\ 


* 


f 


iMr 



4 


ft 








4 ^ 


ft 



« 




•ft^ 


I 


4 


ft 


ft 


# 


4 

I 


4 

4 

% / 


ft 


« 



ft 


t 



ft 


« 

i 


I 

r 


ft 

% 


» 



ft 

ft 



# 


• ^ 


I 


(i 


I 

4 


ft 


ft 



ft 



ft 


/ 


ft 



ft 


ft 


I 




'ft 





•ft 




j 



*- 16 


SECRET 


do witii the determination or bravery or the drive of the Italian 

officers and men; rather the weather, pre-arranged signals, or 

1 

incorrect signals were at fault,” • Altogether, after the arraistice, 

2 

the Italian Navy lost a total of 136,443 tons of ships, with personnel 

losses or casualties difficult to ascertain.* 

d. Navy personnel and “special groups” . Throughout most of 

the period of co-belligerency the overall Strength of the Italian 

Navy was maintained, by the decision of the Allies, at approximately 

79,000 personnel. In order to keep it at this figure, reserves and 

time-expired men wore periodically di Gche.rgod and younger men who 

came in ns tho amy line advansed northward took their places. There 

3 

was no possibility of increasing the personnel strength of the Navy, 
even had the Italians desired it, as long range training programs were 
deemed impractical, and because of physical limitations on the ships 
and installations which the Italiagas had to man. The profession¬ 

al opinion of responsible and informed Allied navs,l officials on the 
efficiency in the perforrfianoo of duty by the Italian Navy’s personnel, 
and on their discipline, military conduct, and standards of maintenance, 
have been, on tho whole, veiy favorable. Admiral ilorgan of the Allied 
Commission, recorded the ”commendable enterprise end individual bravery 

in special operations against tho Axis” itilch Italy’s naval officers 
4 

and men had shovai. Similar favorable comment was contained in other 
communications from the Allied Contniosion to the Italian Navy Ministry, 
in v/hioh praise was accorded the discipline, courage, and devotion to 


1. OSS CID #98154, 22 August 1944, 

2. OSS source T, 20 August 1946, 

3. OSS CID #98154, 22 August 1944, 

4. OSS CID #P-245, 17 February 1945, 


SECRET 






% I 





% ♦ 

4 






4 




tl 


• # 




4 


I 




4 


/ 


I 




\ 

9 




I 


« 


4 










\ 


4 4 


4 • 


• • 



4 




4 


• • • 




0 





9 




4 






4 



I 

♦ 


4 




4 


4 


1 


t • 


« 


4 


/ 


« 


4 




4 


4 


*• 




4 


C 






». 






\ 



\ 

T 


% 




t 



i 



#■ 


* 


» 


I 


I 


» 


La 



« 17 


SECRET 


duty of their men. Special groups ■sdthin the Italian Navy were seen 

1 

to have merited special praise. Amorig these are the San I^rco regi¬ 
ment (Italian l^arines) of approximately 3400 men, which incurred 479 
casualties in*a year of great activity in special assault operations 
or raids behind enemy lines in support of Allied campaigns, chiefly 

* t 

those of the British Eighth Army. A high point in their v/ar record 
ms reached when they co-operated with American and British naval 
forces in clearing the v/ay for later Allied occupation of the key 
ports of Genoa and Spezia in the epring of 1945. Due credit was also 
given by Allied Commission naval authorities to the effective tele of 
the Navy group Calderini .to the Italian Military Intelligence i 
Sill) which maintained clandestine radio information service betiveen 
liberated and enemy-occupied Italy^, end provided Navy personnel for 
special intelligence missions into enemy territory. Often this 
"group*' was able to furnish the Allied Command with needed, advance 
infonnation on conteraplhted enemy attacks, and on the disposition of 
enemy naval or land units. 

o* Contribution of Italian ship repair bases . Without minimising 
any of the activities described above, it should be noted that the Allies 
regarded as most in^ortant of all Italian Navj'’ contributions the ship¬ 
building and repair facilities provided by its dockyards, harbor install¬ 
ations, and trained labor corps, chiefly at Taranto and Naples, Palerno 
and, eventually, Leghorn provided similar services, though on a more 
limited scale. Well over 2,000 repairs, refits, and overhauls were 

1. OSS source T, 20 August 1945. 


SECRET 







I 


y 


t 


i 


4 


4 



^ t 

4 

r 








t 


f 


4 













I 


4 




* 


t 

• -• i 



t 


• • i 



'i — 


« 




* 


A 


1 


/ 



4 


9 


f 


9 




9 




'I 


« 


I 


« 


( 

\'t 

/ 



% 


\ 



t 






< 


9 


• » 


s 






4 

»♦ I 

M 



\ 


t 

t 


.fe 



« 

f 



9 



\ 


♦ 



♦ * 

* • 


\ 


9 


f 


4 




* 





f 


i 


9, 

9 


«9 


4 


♦ 


£ 


4 




» 


« 


r 


* 


^ ‘ 




« 



4 



• « 




« 


T 


4 


4 



4* 


4 





9 


t 


9 


* 









I 




4 4 


4 


> 


i ▲ 


4 




I 



-> 18 


SECRET 


performed for Allied and Italian voBSels at those bases after Soptomber 

1943. Total dockings had con© to over 1,000 by February 19456 The 

yards employed more than 36,000 Italian v/orkmen, and many of th© repair 

squads operated almost entirely under Italian technical direction. As 

many as 150 Allied ships v/ere handled monthly at Italian repair bases, 

thus effecting an enormous economy in time, expense, and labor which 

the Allies T/ould have had to expend liad the ships had to return to 

1 

home ports for repairs. Suoh services were especially valuable 
during and after the Allied landings in Southern France in the late 
summer of 1944. 

Finally there v^as the contribution made by th® few remaining 

2 

serviceable units of Italian naval aviation^ v/hich were ustd for 
reconnaissance and patrol duties under the direction of the Regia 
Aeronautica (Italian Air Force) which in turn was controlled by the 
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces («1AAF) acting through th© Allied Com¬ 
mission. The fruitful and ready co-operation of many skilled Italia}i 
naval teclmicians, scientists, and designers, also deserves mention, 
since their inventions, experimental knowledge, studies, and research, 
wore made available to the Allies in fuller measure than would have 

been the case had such Italians done this merely because they felt 
3 

compelled to do so. 

4 

The twenty-one months ’ record of the Italian Havy (and its 
subsidiary services) in th© Allied cause is illustrated by the 

1. OSS CID #P«=246, 17 Pebniary 1945^ 

2. OSS source T, 20 August 1946; OSS source S-R, 3 March 1945, 

3. OSS source T, 20 August 1945. 

4. OSS source T, 20 August 1945. SECRET 








* 


-*> 




I 


b 



> 


b 


* \ 




% 


b 




4 


» 


I 




; I 


i 

f 

\ 


4 


* 


[ 


P. 

I 

I 

f ' i 

r« 

t"'"' 








- 19 - 


SBCRBT 


following facts and figures!^ 

1. Total tonnago of Alliod shipping ccmvoyedJ 90,000,000 (with 
a monthly average of sli--htly belov/ 4,000,000). 

2* Highest monthly rate attained* 8,000,000 tons convoyed in 
August 1944. 

3. Total personnel transported for the Alliesx 332,000 men (at 
an average rate of 16,000 men per month, and & peak of 38,000 
men transported in liay, 1945)« Italian cruisers transported 
a total of 130,000 men "without incident". 

4. Number of Allied ihips convoyed: 10,530 (at an average of 495 
per month, and with a high of 1,000 in August 1944. 

5. Aar missions underbaJeen: 64 (involving 88 ships which covered 
69,499 miles). 

6. Tonnage losses sustained by the Italian Navy since September 

1943: 135,443. 

7o Repair and maintenance services for ships at Taranto and o 
other shipyards: 690 Allied ships, of all types, heuadled| 

230 Italian ships liandled. 

8* Allied said Italian war and merchant ships put in drydock: 

575 (British monitor Abercrombie repaired and fitted for a 
"special mission"in August In 30 days when lowest estimated 

time was 40 days. 


1. OSS source T, 20 August 1945 


SECRET 






I 


I I 



^ A 












\ 















I 





X 





. » 


♦ 




% • 




I 


t « 



# 





\ 

\ 








•• ^ 


« • 


* 







♦ 


« 












♦ 





« 


i. 


« 


* 


^ • • r 

•• 


«t 







4 






♦ 


# 



k 




« 20 - 


SSCRBT 


3, Italian Air Force s 

a. Reorganiaation of tho Air Force after the Amletice * As 

was the case with the Navy, the Italian Air Koirc© began iimiediately 

to reorganize after the Armistice for the most offectiTe possible 
1 ■ ■ 
collaboration v/ith the Allies, In some respects their problom was 

far more difficult,than was that of tho Na^ and their contribution, 
though eventually useful, we,8 far slower in materializing and even 
more deliberately limited by the Allied military. In contrast to 
the Nayj'', which had suffered heavy losses but was still organisation- 
ally and functionally intact, the Air Force was dispersed, €uid its 
morale was lo\v because of long, forced inactivity o Italy * a xdefeat v/as 
accompanied by the destruction of the major part of Italian aviation 
materiel and equipment, and tho bulk of the industrial potential for 
manufacturing now planes, replacement parts, or special equipment re¬ 
mained in tho hands of the Nasi-Fasoists who controlled northern Italy 
until the end of the war. In addition, the Italian Air Force, and 
certainly much of its key personnel, had been more deeply involved in 
Fascist politics than the other arras of the services. The Regia 
Aeronautic a under Fascism hs-d boooms a t<p-hdavy, inefficient, and 
corrupt, bureaucratic monstrosity, with tiiousends of non-productive 
officials on its rolls but vdth little first-line war equipment. The 
first problem undertaken by the Italian Air Ministry during the Badoglio 
period and continued under Bonomi, was the reduction of offices, coraniands, 
and staff posts toward a gofd of approximately 31,000 personnel. By 
the middle of 1944 this fig:ure was being neared. In addition, between 

1, Based almost entirely on“"a''detailed study of Conditions in the 
Italian Air Forcej OSS source S-R, 3 March 1945. 


SECRET 










f 


11 


Jr 


I • 

r 


t 

> 


y 


1 

t 


i 







i 


! 




* 

5 


■ 

i 


I 


\ 

A' • 


> 


I 


4 



i 


* t 


* 







< 


I 




r 


t 

1 


V' . 


t 


% 





I 


% 





I 


#• 





« 


• y • 



t 


» 




4 


I 




V 




« 





V 




i 


V 


» 


. I 


a* 


r- 


I 

1 



I 


T 


i 




t 




« 


I 






i 


• • 



% 


4r 




« 




♦ 


4 








I 


r . 


4 


I 


« 


• » 








4 




ft 


•• 


ft 



■ « 


t 


I 




\ 




C « 






^ ' 


s 


\ 



ft 


ft 





ft 


i 


s ■» 

4 





« 


* 


-V 





» 


1 



4 






$ 

/ 




» 

« 



f • 




✓ 


I*' 


r 


\ 

. I 


ft 





- 21 - 


SECRET 


twelve and fifteen thousand Aeronautica w orkers and technicians were 
working directly for the Allies at their airports, workshops, or in 

a services capacity. Obviously a substantial ntin^er of Air Force 

*■ 

personnel (pilots and crews as well as ground or technical workers) 
remained scattered over northern and central Italy for some time 
Eifter the Armistice. Those pilots ivho could, and vrere so inclined, 
brought through their planes to libera.ted Italy ^yhere, added to the 
\mits on hand when surrender came, they v;ent to make up vdiat was left 
of the Italian Air Force. 

^* Si^Q and character of the Air Force under Allied supervision . 
At no time during the period of co-belligorency of Italy did the 
Italian Air Force exceed 500 planes, and, as a rule, of these there 
vjare seldom more than 250 which were considered fit for regular use. 
With the exception of about 60 American P-39^s and about 20 old-type 
British Spitfires, and a fow Air-Cobras and Baltimore light bombers, 
(furnished to Italy by the Allies in the latter half of 1944) the 
Aeronautica used its own old°typ@ planes which were rapidly becoming 
obsolete for first-line combat use and ware in constant need of repairs 
and replacement parts. BSaintenanc© of this limited Italian Air Force 
was made almost completely a responsibility of the Italian Air Ministry, 
so that, to keep a few of its own planes in the air, tho Aeronautica 
struggled painfully to develop a repair and maintenance system in 
which reclaimed or salvaged material (old and half-destroyed planes, 
etc.) v/aro cannibalised in the effort to patch up only slightly less 
old planes, permitting a fow more Italian pilots to fly in the cause 


SECRET 









t 


M 




t 


■ 


i 




i 


t 

ll. 


I 

i 


I 




r 


*4 






« 


/ 


t 



¥ 


4 


# 



> 


4 


4 


f 


«# 




4 


» 




4 



/ 








f I 




r 




I 










4 


/ 


K - 


7 

;• 





«• 4 




» 


« 


« 


« 


I 




4 

4 


» 


4 


i 


4 


i 


#► 

s 


4 


♦ 




i 


4 




I 

I 


0 


% 



^ 4 


* $ 

» 



4 




4 


♦ 


I 

f 


S 


« 


» 


1 


V 

4 


I 

i 


4 


4 


4 


4 


4 


♦ 


> 




I 


4 





4*4 




f 


% 



» *4 


4. 


4 





« 


« 


t • 


I 



4 

t 



. I 


4 


4 


f 





4 


4 


4 


•» 


• 4 


< 

t 

• • 







I 


4 






I .* 



» 


•■ ) 


I 


% 




« 


1 


9 



* 





% 




I 


t 


' 4 


r 



t 


I 


1 

t 


« 




/ 


« 




\ 




» 




* 


r 


A 







♦ 




I 

t 



4 


1 




. t 



4 


•* 


«• 


. ^ 
4 


« 



» 


I « 





4 


4 




4 


« 




4 






4 




\ 

r 




I 



i 





- 22 


SECRET 


of national liberation. The results achieved vifere certainly better 
than might have been oxpootad, considering the low pay, poor rations, 
and inadequate living quarters which wore all that the Aeronautica 
succeeded in obtaining for its flight and ground persorinel engaged 
in operational work for the Allies. 

c. Types and importance of Air Force missions . After January 
1944, the modestly reorganized Italian Air Force was chiefly employed 
as part of the Balkan Air Force, a dependency of MAAP, Its principal 
actions were in support of the land operations of Tito’s Yugoslav Array 
and of the Italian Garibaldi division v/hich wont over to Tito at the 
time of the Armistice. Various eatimates indicate that nearly 60^ 
of Balkan Air Force missions wore assigned to the Italians, under 
overall British commando Their fighter-plans squadrons (as long as 
south Italian air bases were near enough to the objectives) provided 
fighter-escort for bombers and trsnsport pianos, and were used to 
attack enemy troop concentrations and installations<> The bomber- 
transport units operated against enemy shipping in the eastern Adriatic 
and against land objectives in addition to their supply functions for 
Tito’s troops. Seaplanes were used chiefly for reconnaisoance and 
detection of mines in the Adriatic, and to a limited extent in the 
Tyrreheaian Sea. Their missions into the Balkans were especially 
dangerous because most of their planes were outmoded and constantly 
liable to mechanical failures making thorn easy prey to enemy attack 
or capture. Italian pilots and crows badly lacked modern personal 
flight gear and clothing, and yet they demonstrated groat bravery 


SECRET 







- 23 - 


SECRET 


and capacity for which they eventually received public praise from 
I14AF, from the RAP, from the Allied Coisrriission, and from Tito* 

d« Allied policy restricted Italian flights but drew heavily 
on their maintenance facilities* . The fervent hope of th© Italians 
that eventually at least a few of their ovm air units mi^^-,ht take 
part in the fighting against th© Germans in northern Italy, over 
Italian soil, was never destined to be really fulfilleda By spring 
of 1945 the Allied Air Sub^-CommiBoion had arrived at the conclusion 
that the Italian planes, most of them, were not longer serviceable 
for regular first-line duty and that th© size of the Italian air force, 
in active planes^ would have to be further reduced.* The end of the 
war v;as coining into sight and the Allied decision was that economy 
and efficiency of effort called for using all available Allied planes, 
gasoline, etc. by the Allied air forces themselves rather than divert¬ 
ing a few more modern planes to the Italians. Though this aocision 
v/as probably fundamentally sound, and long-range policy considerations 
may have been behind it, it should nevertheless be remembered that th© 
extent to which the Italians contributed to th© furtherance of the war 
effort in the air was always strictly limited by tho materials which 
they could produce or obtain from the Allies. The use to which the 
Italian stir force was put, tactically and strategically, was always 
rigidly determined by the British air coatnandors representing AlAAF. 

In tho field of repair, and maintenance of Allied planes, airfields, 
and other facilities th© work of Italian skilled aviation labor end 
technicians can be said to have more nearly approached the similar 


SECRET 







fH 




J 


4 






9 






<1 




I 


K 

I 






9 




4 


4 


« 






« 


I 


4 


I 




I 


• # 



J 




I 


I 


•4 


I 


I 


I- 


4 \ 


% 


1 ’ 





4 



^ 4 



j 


t f 


« 


•• • 


p 


« 


« 


r 


rP 


# 



t 


-V 


f 





V f 




4 




t J * 

4 


4 

« 


4 


4 




« 



I 


4 






I 


I 



« 


4 


t 


r 


I 



I 


I 


9 




4 


f 


> « 


I 


/ 


* 

t 


« 




« 


4 

' 


> 


f 




1 


* 




* 


« 


.» 



♦ 




I 



p 





X 




« 




• „ 


V 




> 




4 


{ 


t 

4 


4 




- 24 - 


SECRET 


contribution mad© to the Allied imr effort by the ship repair and 

maintenance contributions of similar units of the Italian Navy* 

e» Statements of Allied leaders* Authoritative evaluations 

of the role of the Italian air force as an auxiliary of the Allied 

forces wore given, from tirae to time, by British prime minister 

CiiUrchill and by the head of th© Allied Air Sub-Conunission at Rome, 

Air Vice-r/iarshal Bov/en-B .uscarlot* In a parliamentary address on 

u5ay 24, 1944, Churchill said;^ "Th© loyal Italian Air Force has.... 

fought so well that I am making special efforts to supply them with 

improved aircraft of British manufacture." Bowen-Bouscarlet, in a 

2 

report of 22 August 1944 to the Allied Commission, coramonted on th© 
good record of the Italian fighter-v/ing particularly. E© added that 
morale in the Italian Air Force was at times a problem, but admitted 
That this was largely due to a ration and subsistence level undesirably 
iov/, snd to political and economic conditions in Italy wliich further 
depressed.the personnel of the Air Force to i?Aiich Fascism had already 
done so much moral damage. 


1« Parliamentary Debates, 24 Ivlay 1944, Vol. 482. 
2, Cit) #8164, ^'Ougust 1944. 


SECRET 













- 25 - 


SECRET 


4. Partisan resistance activity* , 

a. Statements of Allied officers» The Italian partisan movement 
developed from poorly coordinated clandestine bands into an organization 
able to offer considerable military, political, and economic support to 
the Allied imr effort in Italy. It organized resistance to German and 
neo-Fascist military forces, carried out planned sabotage programs, 
acted as an important part of the Intelligence service of Allied military 
forces, and prepared to re-establish Civil administration when the 
occupied areas were liberated. These activities of the Italian partisans 
are generally regarded as one of the most valuable contributions that' 
co-belligerent Italy made to the Allied war effort. This assistance 
}ia8 been acknowledged frequently by British and American officials. On 
22 I5ay 1944 General Alexander, then Commander of the Allied Armies in 
Italy (AAI), publicly recognized the military value of the partisans 
for the first time by declaring that they v^jre "holding in check six 
German divisions."^ 

Upon the termination of hostilities. General llark Yh Clark, Commander 
of the Fifteenth Army Group, broadcast on 8 May 1S45, "...In this day of 
victory in Europe I send my fervent greetings to all Italian patriots, 
v*io have shared with my armies all the hardships of the campaign. In 
this exultant hour I wish to express my grateful congratulations not 
only for your courage and spirit of sacrifice, but also for the valor 
you have shown on the field of battle. The vital contribution you gave 


lo OSS R&A Ro. 2993, 31 March 1945 


SECRET 








( 


1 * ' 




I 


/ 






f 


» 


\ 

4 


■ ■ • • i 

I 


» 


> 


t 


« 




a 


* ‘ 


* » 



I 


¥ 


r 


4 


». t 4 


1 


j 0 




• fc» 





¥ 


4 


% 


L 





S* • ♦ 


« 


>• 



♦ T 
f 


« % 


• * 




» 

« 


4 

^ *4 


4 


% 


♦ 


k 


4 


4 


V 







I •• 


/ » 


4 


« 






4 


% 


4 


t 






4 


i 


V \ 




^ 






V, 


%• 


» 




V 


» 




« 




i ^ ^ 

• , 4 • . * 

\ 


) 



I ' ^ . 


4 


I 

I 


I 







k 


\ 


4 ^ 


t 

I 


4 

4 


4 


« 


I 


t 




4 


« 


4 







4 




/ 







♦ " > 




i 




4 









4 




4 




I 


4 


4 


'«* 


¥ 


■ 4 


4 


» 


• » 






4 * 




•« 


r 


4 



» 


4 


4 


4 


t 




1 


^ . ** 


« 


♦ . 


I 


I 


I 


• 4 


« 






- 26 ~ 


SECRET 


to the coinmon cause and your initiati*^ have saved northern Italy from 
destruction* You have al\mys behaved like disciplined soldiers obey¬ 
ing the orders I issued to you during the various phases of battle.” 

Furthermore, General Clark has stated publicly that many of Italy’s 
largest cities v/ere freed by the partisans themselves before the arrival 
of the Allied armies. "Like Milan, Turin did not wait to b® liberated,” 
he asserted. "Rising against the Nasi-Fascist enemy, Turin dealt a 
mortal blov/ and contributed to his defeat. To the people of Turin, to 
the CRL, which organised the insurrection, to the Freedom Volunteers, 

who rose in arms to free the 6ity, go congratulations and my apprecia- 

. 2 . 

tion of what was done." Two days later similarly he addressed the 

people of Venice; "It may be said in truth that your city has been freed 

from the inside by the artoed forces of ihe Freedom Volunteers, with the 

help and the encouragement of the entiri population. The port zone and 

3 

the public services of Venice have been saved." Also acknowledging 

and praising the partisan role in the liberation of the North, the 

British Ministry of Information reported that the swift, violent uprising 

of the patriots quickly destroyed the Gorman grip and saved valuable 

4 

installations from enemy "scorched earth" plans. 

b. General description of partisan strength . Although there 
were temporary setbacks from time to time, the partisans steadily 
developed in both nun&era and effectiveness. It has been estimated 

1, OWI; European News Digest, 10 May 1945. 

2. OWIt European News Diges t, S May 1946. 

3o 07/1; Kuropeafriiew3"~ljigeatr, 5 May 1945. 

4. Nexv YoBc Times, 30 April 1945. 


SECRET 










1 


i 


I 


•» 


^ : .r ^ . *■ 

j 

I I 

.- :ii 


»■- 
M 


.' , •• lii*,. 

. I 
/ t 


• ,T(} • 

■'a 

M 

. ri<- 


. 'i • 'j ' ' L? ‘ 

. t* ; : 


. ‘ t; 


• r 


: 


' I- 

. r 


r: 




♦ • 


k • 


V-- ; 


r . ■ 


• ' •»?• j 


* .»;■ 


. 1* 

j r. 


. I 
' < 


V 


:: 'I- 


, I 

‘/r' 

'/t-* 


r* f 


<. 


.IT J, » 


. r 


, . »j. 




L . 


• ’’ » 


1 


J 


' r 


*■ 


J' ■ 


•> 

•\ • \ 


• >• 

{ ■! 


< - ». 


i/ 




I 


/ 

t 




-• 








i. 










f 


I 


; t 

i 










0 


* • 


/ 




% 




! 



' » 

• \ 


9 


•» • 


« 


s 



% 




I 


« 






• 


► 


« 


I 



\ 





« 


». 


» 




# ' 
•k 


» 

/ 


I 


< 


« 

> 




V 


J 



1 




\ 


i 




t 


4 


4 

4 


I < 
f 




t 





i 


I 



•« 


A 








4 


« 








-1 



» 


« 



t 


♦ 


* 


» 

I 




< 


s 





I 


t 


^ • 


f 


f 






• • 


4 


I 

• % 




> 


I- 


« 


» 


C > 



9. 

* 


4 


M 


I 


\ 


V 


t 


/ 


/ 






- 27 


SECRET 


that by March 1944 25#000 patriots actively engaged in anti-Nazi 

activities. By June of the same year the axiniber had increased to 
2 

80,000* Reasonably precis© ostiaatos indicated that by the end of 

Kovonber 1944 there wore operating in Eimilia, Liguria, Lombardy, 

Piedmont, Tuscany, and Vaneto, about 99,600 "political partisems” 

(primarily members of underground political parties) end about 82,000 

military partisans (coii 5 )risi 2 lg elements of the Italian Army which found 

themselves in German^occupied territory at the time of the collapse of 
3 

the Fascist regime). These figures varied considerably depending 
upon the season, availability of supplies, and the course of the war. 
During August of 1944 a unified command was established under the 
military direction of General Gadoma to coordinate the six regional 
oommands of partisan formations, This Supreme Partisan Command con¬ 
tributed the military branch of the over-all political organization, 
the Committee of National Liberation for North Italy (CLNAI), and 
served to unify the partisan movement and represent it in dealing with 
Allied military forces and the Italian Government. Through the efforts 
of this central organization, at the beginning of April 1945 an estimated 

200,000 partisans had been enrolled to operated under the leadership 

4 

of General Cadoma, the Supreme Partisan Commander, Undoubtedly this 
figure was greatly augmented by the end of th© month when all partisan 
forces united to participate in the final military and political opera¬ 
tions willoh culminated in the capture of Mussolini, Rodolfo Graziani, 

1. OWI: European News Digest , 11 May 1946. 

2, Ibid , 

5, R & A No, 2993, 31 March 1945. 

4, New York Herald Tribime, 5 April 1945. SECRET 








t 


N 


I 













i 




r 




I 



* 


^ ■ 



*• • 




i 

I 


V 






■N* 





• t 


f 



1 





** 


' * 


4 



\ 



\ 











I 





•“ 28 


SECRET 


Roberto Farinacci, Aohille Staraoo, Alossandro Pavolini, and many 
other prominent neo-Fasoist leaders. 

operations . 

(l) laXitary action . Th© olandestino nature of partisan 
activities clearly precluded their mounting of any large-scale military 
operations until the final liberation of the North v/as at hand. How¬ 
ever there is evidence that the partisans ware able with increasing 
frequency to plan harassing action and to carry out tactical movements 
involving several thousand troops. Thb value of this type of military 
action consisted in pinning dov/n significant enemy troop concentrations, 
thus reducing the mobility of Gertnan defonsive forces in North Italy. 
VJhile complete information on specific military action carried on by 
the partisans is not rekdily available because of th© necessary secrecy 
that attended it and the difficulties involved in collecting accurate 
data on a series of unconnected movements, some idea of the type of 
activity can be furnished. For example, in July and August 1944 the 
peu^isans were said to have constituted a significant threat to th© 
enemy rear guard in the Gothic Line, controlled the border between 

Prance and Italy in the Aosta Valley, and dominated several large 
1 

mofuntainoue regions. In the same period they were reported to have 
been able to intercept as much as Wfo of enemy supplies and to have 
caused 1,730 confirmed enemy casualties in various skirmishes engaging 
about 850 troops, plus an undeterimed nuiaber of isolated assassinations. 
During the months of Docember 1944 and January 1945 th© pax-tisans are 

1, OSS, R & A No. 2993, 31 March 1945. 


SECRET 







V 



> 




.# 


« 



0 



s 


% 


% 


% 


• \ 

9 





4 



•* 



•f 

4 ^ 


• « 






# 


« 



• #♦ 


4 


« 

# 





% 



% 








4 


# 


# 


» 


• * 


% 


\ 


*4 


• ' 



* 


9 


4 


$ 




i 




9 


\ *• 


* 







w 


6 


« 

« 






# 




i 


t 



• • 
9 


’♦WA 


« 29 - 


SECRET 


said to have assailed at least two enemy garrisons causing approximately 

1,1(X) enemy casualties, and to have engaged about 14,700 enemy troops 

1 

in various op©rations♦ 

As the Allied troops moved northwards Partisan military action 
was directed to operate in conjunction with the Allied advances* The 
most spectacular, and perhaps the most valuable, military contribution 
of the partisan resistance was its participation in the final insurrection 
of North Italy* Following months of preparation, on 25 April 1945 CLNAI 
ordered a general strike in Milan and the General Comraand ordered in¬ 
surrection in the early hours of April 26, In the meantime the uprising 
had spread throughout northern Italy* Before the arrival of Allied 
troops, the patriots dominated many Alpine valleys and rural areas and 
had instigated riots and strikes, a 8 s\ 2 ming control in practically all 

the major north Italian cities, such as Bologna, Verona, Genoa, Milan, 

2 

Turin, and Venice. 

(2) Sabotage * Before actual liberation, sabotage consti¬ 
tuted one of the most important contributions that the partisans made 
to the Allied war effort. This activity consisted of blowing up high- 
« 7 ay and railroad bridges, cutting railroad lines, destroying German 

troop and supply trains, factories, aircraft, munition dumps and ships 

Z 

controlled by the Nazi-Fascists, One estimate states that patriot 

sabotage 'vvork in 1944 included the interruption of 16 railway^lines 
used by the enemy in Ravenna, Forll, and Bologna areas alone. 

1, OSS, RM No. 2993, 31 March 1945* 

2, OSS, R&A No. 1112.108, 28 April 1945. 

3. OSS, R&A No. 2993, 31 March 1945. 

4. OWI; Italian News Bulletin, 3 January 1945. 


SECRET 











r 






•> 


•4 


( 


« 


• ^ 

•• 




(► 


«t 






• 4 


» 


) 


•. t 




] 



•’ t 


0 . 






) 


I 


t 




1 


f 


». ■•> 



I 

I 



t 

I 



< 


» 


•• 



t 



i 

* 



* 





/ 


r » 


f 






4 


k 


I 



N 



t 

t • 


« 


t« 


\ 


i 


t 




4 

» 




i 




* 


< 








/ 


« 


i 



IJ 




t 


t 



\ » • 


I 


* 


4 




t 


I 


I 




* 


* 


« 

9 


# 




♦ 



I 





I 



I • 


« 








# 





^ ♦ • 


« 




% 


* 


4 




I 




I 




» 


» 


« S 




!• 


\ 

^ 1 


k 


* 

i 






I 


I 




. « 




« » 










♦ • 


4 




* 

• • 


S 




« • 


« 


4 

« 




•' 

I • » 


% 


« 




I 


4 


I 



I 


4 




1 


‘t 


N 


V 


j 





I 


) 


f 





I 




.« 


\ 


/ 


r 



I 









/ 



f 









- 30 » 


SECRET 


(3) Military Intelligenoo. Both Italian and American sources 
have accredited the partisans with siapplying important and accurate 
military intelligence to Allied B'orc© Headquarters in Italy, In this 
sphere they are said to have been particularly helpful in reporting 
the location of enemy troop concentrations, troop or supply movements, 
and locations of enemy military depots* They also provided guides to 
lead Allied patrols in difficult mountain areas, and were often instru¬ 
mental in assisting escaped Allied prisoners-of-war to return to friendly 
1 

territory* 

(4) Casualties suffered , vVhile no exact figures are avail¬ 
able at this time regarding the number of casualties suffered by the 
partisans •themselves, many units v/ere completely wiped out. In 
addition, it is well to recall that many losses were incurred by 
Italians who were not directly in'rolved in patriot acti'^ity, Italians 
whose deaths are attributed to partisan resistance. These victims 
were frequently taken as hostages and killed in reprisal for acts 
committed by the patriots. For example, in Rom® in March 1944, 320 
hostages were reported to have been killed by the Germans in retaliation 

for the patriot attack on German and Fascist groups celebrating the 

2 

tv/enty-fifth anniversary of Fascism. On 4 August 1944 Castagno (near 

Florence) was completely destroyed by ■fche Germans follovdng a clash in 

3 

April between partisans there and German bands, A Swiss'report states 

that in early A.pril 1945, 246 hostages were executed in retaliation for 

4 

an attack against German transports. 


1, OSS, RAA No, 2993, 31 March 1945* 

2, New York Times, 27 and 29 March 1944. 

3, T5WH Itaii^^liewo Bulletin, 3 Janmry 1945, 
4o OWI; European News Digest, 15 April 1945, 


SECRET 










/ 








- 31 - 


SECRET 


d* Passive and civil disobedience » Large-scale political and 

goonomic unrest in encmy-occupied territory has been accredited to the 

partisans by both Allied and Italian sources. According to Italian 

Government officials, the important strikes which almost paralysed in-. 

dustrial activity at Milan in March 1944 and at Genoa in May of the 

same year, as well as the strikes on 14 February 1945 in Turin and 

1 

23 lilarch in ililan, were partisan provoked. In addition, many other 

labor disorders, strikes, slovz-dovms, and sabotage of industrial goods 

are said to have been the result of patriot civil activity. To suppress 

these disorders the Fascists are reported to have v/ithdrawn food cards 

2 

and the Nazi Gestapo to have arrested hundreds of workers in Milan. 

Furthermore, the partisans carried out propaganda campaigns 
directed against the neo-Fascist regime and the Germans. Clandestine 
papers were published by various partisan political organizations; 
posters and leaflets were distributed among large sectors of the 
civilian population of North Italy. An indication of the efficacy of 
this activity can be found in the fact that the neo-Fascist and German 
authorities found it necessary to adopt measures involving severe penal¬ 
ties for the possession of patriot propaganda or for engaging in propa¬ 
ganda activities. 

^ 0 . Factor in Italian morale . An intangible, yet very real, 

contribution of the partisan resistance was its stimulation of the pro- 
Allied sentiments of the Italian people in both occupied and liberated 


lo OSS, R&A No. 2995, 31 ?&irch 1945, 

2. OSS, R&A No. 1112,95, 27 January 1945 


SECRET 










- 32 - 


SSCRBT 


aroas* From th© military and political activitioa of the patriots, 
Italians derived a feeling of national pride and sense of rodemptioa 
from tlie troadharies of Fascism. Repeatedly Italian (Jovefnment officials 
and th© people themselves indicated that they regarded the partisan 
movement as Symbolizing their will to participate and aid in the Allied 
war effort. 


I 



f 


" I I V 
















i 




• % 

I 


4 




T 


1 


9 





» 






9 


4 

t 


I 


4 


4 . 

« 


t 


% 


«•• 


4 



> 




t 


* 4 

* • 

✓ 


I 


*» 


* ♦ 



4 




* 












I 


* 


*f 

J 




k ■ 


( 


4 






f 


I 



I 


t 


i 


% 


4 


9 


J 



\ 

4 


i‘. 



y 


I 


c 


t 


% 


9 


4 


$ 


* 


f 


i 


I 

I 


I 


Hi4 


I 


T. f. 



» 


t 





- £3 - SSCRET 

^ Economic Contribution to the Alliod »Var Effort 

a. Al\G Lir® Issue . Italy*s largest single economic contri¬ 
bution. to the Allied v/ar effort t/as in terms of the goods and services 

provided in exchange for the estjjnated C560,000,000 issued by the 

1 

Allied military authorities in Italy in the form of AiJG lire« Perforce^, 

the Italian government accapted e.nd backed this currency, tiiough it 

received no credits or advances from the Allies for tliia purpose« It 

fulfilled the clause of the armistice vjhich stipulated that the 

Italians should pay for the costs of the occupying forces« Despite 

protests and attempts to alleviate the terns of the armistice, this 

financial obligation was in general accepted in a cooperative spirit, 

2 

lemonstratad by the success.ful war bond drive of I&.y 1946* 

Jy-o adequate analysis of v/hat was obtained by the Allies in return 

for the Aij!G lire has yet boon published by the military authoritiesc 

One of the largest iteeiB would be the pay issued to Allied troops and 

spent by them in Italy; American 30r'’;lo0men spent $150^000,000. Supplies 

such as an estimated 10,000 tons of meat and 2,000,000 tons of vegetables 

3 

were purcha.sed v/ibh these lire. Italian workers in the employ of the 
Allies a:ad sometimes Itnlia.i firms producing for the Allies v/ero also 
paid in AMG lire. Requisitlonod services end materials ivore not, 
hov/evor, purchased. 

b, Italian Ex ports to the United Nations . During the same 
period, ie. from September 1943 to Juno 1945, Italy was able to resume 
export shipments to the United Nations, though, to be suie, the weak 

1. $613,000,000 were issued in all, but since about ^^»000,000 i.ver 0 
issued to the Badoglio goverruiient and to various municipalities for 
their ovai expenditures, this sum has been deducted from the Allied 
account. 

2. OSS source D, (IS No, 620), 5 liay 1945. 

3. 0I''AR report. ; ... 


SECRET 














- 54 • SECRET 


Italian Exports to tho United Hationa o During '.he eanie 
period, i.e*, from September 1943 to Juno 1945, Italy vias able to 
ros’jmo export Ehipmonts to the United Nations, though, to bo sure, 

N 

the woal: position of Italian oconomy did not porinit a large voiumo. 

About 100,000 tons, •valued at $21,381,499, were exported: 78/? 

\ 

to CJreat Britain and hor colonies, 10/? to the United Stat\^B, to 

Franco ?nicl her colonies, and So)? to other IJediterranoan countries. 

Substantially all the goods exported '.vero not v/ar materia'..s, the sole 

notable exception being hemp, used principally by Great Britain for 
1 

naval stores<> Though it is to bo assumed that all recipient countries 

Y/ill credit Italy ^vith the proceeds from these sales, as the United 
States has donep no such credits v/ere set up during the Buropear. war.. 

The total Italian contribution, strictly moasureabie in monetary teirns, 
Eoay be set at $581,OOOflOCOo 

3 « Coi mteracting Effect of Imports from Allied countries . In 

ordar to obtain the not Italian contribution in sold goods and servicos, 

the estimated $300,000,000 worth of essential civilian supplies, shipped 

into Italy by iho Allies during ttio war period, must be doductod, leaving 

a figuro of $281,000^000® Foodstuffs made up 74/? of this total, and 

coal, 22 %; Great Britain and Canada sent slightly i/iore (57^ than the 
2 

Unitod States (43^)« 


lo Table of foreign trade composed from unpublished FEA otatistios. 

2, OSS CID #P-=-274, Noo 56, 5 Juno 1944o 

Allied Shi pments of Civilian Supplies to Ito.ly through 31 Ilarch 1945 o 

mot* 

Foods t\Aff 1,504,983.6 

Coal (est.) 450,000* 

Agricultural Supplies 

and Equipment 70,255.3 

.v'iscellaneous * 40,560»6 

2,065,798.5 


SECRET 











35 


. SISCKET 


shipping saved * Tho Tralue of the Italira contribution 

of goods a^d servicon, botli paid for in AiSG liro and simply requisitioaoda 

my also b3 meattured by tho shipp ing tonnoga which the Allies saved by 

procuring supplies locsJ.lyo Tl.e Coaibined Civil Affairs Cormiittaa of 

1 

AFEQ stated that 3,180,552 tons were saved in this manner o The im¬ 
ports of essential civilian supplies montioned above conruraed 2,065,000 
tons of Allied ©hipping, Therefcre, Italy's net shipping contribution, 
di ©regarding the services perl’orired imder Allied directicn by the 
Italian merchant rnarin®, may be sot at 1,115,000 i;ons, 

uiervicQfi requisitioned by Allied forceg . In 
addition to the Italiasi econondo contribution which can be measured 
with some precision in monetary tozmi, Italy contributed large .luiwiante 
of Eiaterials and services, requieitioned by the Allied fcrcee. Avail¬ 
able data permit in most cases only the rog,ghost estiioatss of the aise 
of this contribution, since r©quif3itj.oi\ing xvas done in the early (k’.ys 
of the occupation in a haphazard nannor and since the military authori¬ 
ties have published to date little infonnation on the extent of 
recuisitioningo 

The moet accurate accounting of requisitioned services has been 
that done by the Italian State Railxmye, Ail during the war period, 
militar'y trains were operated over tlie Italian system and had, of 
cocxae, the highest priority^ The Italian adminictration stated that 
$6&,00C','X}0 ware spent for the maintenance of lines, locomotives, and 

lo Ibido British services used 67^, American, 46 % was used 

by~5xe engineering branches of both armies (presumably engineering 
supplies) and 45?^ by the quartermaoter and tiransport sorvieee* 


SSGRSl' 







A ’ ' 









\ a 


f^r. 


f 


?* 


t i 4 


\ •••• 


"' w. i 


f' 


r . M , *1 


♦♦ >♦ 1 .' ' ’’’■»• * 
'-US...— ^ ' 


iT ^ ’ 


V'i 


t 

IT '■ 






V** 


t: 


* I 


4 • ^ 



ti 


*♦ 


••H A / 


* ' » 




vv. ’ 4 


-«f 


r 


rl ^ ^• 


^ -i.,- » ' • .,• 

’ t 




^v. - '*> 


% 

■A* 


f* V 


*• 


% ^ t 


•■ '‘fi •* 


r 

4 


" . ' .V 


f Vi" -^ 


.t M* " 




I •’ 


^ »Si 

V ^ 


■m ^jS 


I 


U-> 

n 


4-# ‘ , •• • 

I 


y 




1'^ ^ 


I V 


* *T 




.• s 


t-r-. 


*- ♦ ''■*' ^9*' V . 

»*■ 






* !*■ I 


:*■ 1 




t.;.^ ^ M .%♦«,» . “ 




. V .-^. 


•.•v *. 




.; • 








3'^-' 0„-- '^ '■ *■ -''■%. ‘’V* 

t 

* ^' Af f jJ-t'f ?'* ** "■' ^•'* 


• 4* S • - 

•V 4 


• '• '.W 

.V 


.1 - 


f\ ‘1 


h 1 


•* •*v • -^. 




\ ' * 

#* 


f' /• 


» < _i 




>.' r - , 




r » 


A »*• 


b; 


I. s 


ft . 


/v 


n ^ 

>'*'t" ' * 


V r i.^ 


.*,1 •» 


• * ..n# 


. s- 


•f-i f 

»•’ 




• A ’ • 

V •, -“■ ■ *J ‘r V ^ ' n. ’■ 


ft. 


* ^ .L 

I • 


•'. t f 


I • 



-f , tacji ^ ^ 


' ft. 


.T 


ft ■» 




H •< i 


« t 


■•i' — *'irii 


• fff!J 




• '.I i 


lifh . 




< A 


' * \. '-v 




e > - ^c 




A s. 


/• 




► ^. 


pm. - 


' T V ■ 

•iflftvV,,. 


A 


;j^ ■** • 

V 


t 




> *. w ift 




. t. 


^ ip ft ^ 

• 4^ 





* ♦. 


.. 













36 


ssoi-^^a 


1 

rolling stock and for tho trar.'.spcrt of Allied mat^arials and pcrsonnol* 

Practically all that reimdnod of tho Italian merchant marine at 

the tima of the annistico v/orked directljr under Allied svper^sion and 

waB rfiturjiod bo Italian control ocJy after th© ©nd of hositilitiea in * 

May 1945^ Though over SO^ of Italiac. iaerchant tonnage (ell ships of 
\ 

• 10,000 gross tons and over) was sunk or fell into the hands of one or 

the other belligeront powers, the remaiador, connisting of sevon'by 

small coastal sboaRiere in poor repair, performed T-diat services? it 

couldo All ahipo of moro tliar. 300 tone displacement wore put vmder 

th© adminifstration of tho MEDEO (M8ditorran?3an Skipping Board); a 

total tonnage of about 300,000 tons worked on Allied account» Of the 

ships under 300 tons displacement, 35,000 tons wore used*for Allied 

Z 

shipments and 15,000 for Italian civilieoi neods* The contribution of 

3 

requsitionod Italian shipping has been rouglily ©stiiuated at 180,000,000*^ 

Port facilities and ship^-ards were requisitioned by the Allies, 

and nearly 680 Allied warships wore repaired in -fhs yards* 

h’ith th© available data an ‘estimate of the value of th© Italian 

contribution in tho form of requisitioned buildings and industrial 

facilitio -3 can only be very roughly mde* Th© AC-Itaiian Government 

ladustrifd census showed that ^,000 rooirta and i?9 factories wore 

4 

occupied by Allied troopc as of Sopteraber 1944^ but these figures 

la Report of the Ministry of Conmunications. 

Provisional repair of bridges, viaducts, etc* | 35,790,000 

S:qp®i 3 Qfl for shops, labor, locomotives,rolling 5,000,000 

stock 

Running ©jqpenaes on Allies shipmsat® 28,360,000 

Total § 69,450,000 

2 a OSS sourc<3;l. May 1845* ' 

3. See above. Contributions of Italian Navy. 

4c Consimaato e Indagini per Xa ricogtruaione naaionale, Comniiasione 

A11 ea:ba^ 9 Tstituto Contrale di Statistioa. RnTn<>.FAhTn3i»i-v T945. 00,118,174 













37 


SECRET 


ar© not only inoomplote but give no 5jadication of tho longth of tiino 
the buildings were ocjcupied, Sictjo the Italian government pays the? 
OT-vners of requisitior.ed property a rontal on the property^ an indica¬ 
tion of tho extent of prive.tely cmied requiaitionod property may be 

gained from the size of tiieso go^ornciontal pajoaen'cs- Italian sources 
\ 

ste^to thiiit about ylO,000^000 a znoath is paid out in this aannor^ tho 
Terni Coo, for exsjnple,, receives 'z he.lf a mill5,on dollars a month for 
rental, on its requsitionod plantsi. Gt)voi'ninental properties^ such e.a 
ministries in Horae, schools, and iiimicipal facilities, have also been 
requieitioned, but no indications of tho extent of thia cattribution 
are available ut present* 

Manjr other minor requisitioned items, such ar. 30,000 horsec and 

mules, agricultural facilities, communications fac.ilities and supplies, 

automobiles, otco, can b® only veiy roughly estiirxited* 

*f* Ita lian B a crifice in na tional inocme an ci i standard of living , 

Italy* 3 gross cjoritribution to the war effort both in AKG lira purchases 

and requisitioned goods and services .my be roughly estinuited at 
1 

^S’00,0f00,000* Deducting ^325,000,00*3 for Allied assistajice to Italy, 
a net contribution of |b?5,000,000 ie indicated* This figure repre¬ 
sents approximetely 27^ of the income of liberated Italy during tho 
war period* When it is considered thfit the country had aJ.ready under¬ 
gone a severe less of income through the damages and dislocationa 
caused by the wai*, tho degree of Italian economic sacrifice demanded 
and obtained by the Allies is contiderablo. 


!• See Table 1* ' 


SECRET 





V.! 


* 


/ ■ 


-1 




I 


I 


r 




a 

r 











- 38 - 


SECRET 


Allied observers in Italy, such as Archbishop Spellman, Judge 

Marchisio, and the labor delegation of Septeirber 1944, agree that 

the standard of living of the mass of the population was extremely 
1 

lowo A detailed American study made in October 1944, in the devastated 

regions between the Gustav and Hitler lines exposed starvation conditions 

€uid serious lack of shelter; Col« Poletti stated that such conditions 

were to be found in areas where severe combat took place* Italian 

General Confederation of Labor 8t^xiie3 in Rcwne showed that an average 

working class budget of a family of four entailed expenditures of 1688 

lire a week for a minimum subsistence; on® man’s weekly wage was 0 sti« 

mated at between 300 and 600 lire® PWB studies of similar social groups 

set a figure of 3000 lire a week as a minimum expense for a family of 

four® Hardship in Florence, Pisa, and Lucca became so acute that 

serious disorders hindering military operations were feared by GeneiA 

2 

Clark® Such disorders did take place in Palermo® 

The low standard of living was reflected in the decided increase 

of infant mortality and tuberculosis in Some during the summer of 1944® 

Allied distribution of food, totalling 788 calories a day in August, 

, 3 

led to an iirqprovement in the situation* 


1® OSS CID #102583, 1 Novenbor 1944® 

2. Nows Digest, 15 November 1944; OSS CID #p-204, 2 October 1945; OSS 
#41256, 20 October and #41503, 24 October 1944® 

3. A 50^ increase in mortality of infants under one year of age was 
shown as against 1943 for the months of June July and August. A 
42^ increase in tuberculosis deaths as against 1942 was shoiwi for 
the months of January to June 1944® Report of General Wilson, 

OSS source D, 29 September 1944® 


SECRET 









• I 


« 

t # 




• % 


r ♦ 










I 


A 




« 


X 






t 




J 






» 






f 


i 


h 







« . 


I 


« 



% 


i 


V 

* 


• s« * 


t 




r 


I 




# 


t 


4 


I 


I 





^ * 


« 


i 


« 


2 


•« 

• ' 1 


A 

K 


% 


t 


4 


K- 


♦ ^ • • 


I 


V 

I 






r 


* t 

1 


« 


• » < 


«ki « 






• • 


4 • 




s 


9 


» » 




% 


» 


I 


r 


9 


9 • 






» 







X 


r 


. . « 

« 


I 1 



I 


k 




J 


I 


i 


r 


t 








f 


4 







i 




- 39 - 


SECRET 


g. Spirit of economic cooperation » Under ouch conditions it 
is not remarkable that Italian labor organizations attempted to gain 
an increase in wages for the workingmen and that the Italian govern¬ 
ment urged the importation of essential civilian supplies even at the 
expense of sacrificing shipping apace needed for \var materials* State¬ 
ments of Italian leaders show that they were primarily concerned with 
avoiding serious internal disorders and possible political repercussiona, 
which might well have been injurious to the war effort. 

The policy of economic, as wall as political and military, collabo¬ 
ration with the Allies was followed. Despite considerable difficulties, 
the amassing program succeeded in gathering 92 % of the 1944 -Ji^eat crop 
by the end of February (96^ of the 1942 crop was amassed by Fascist 

officials using an organization comparatively undisturbed by war 
1 

conditions). The Italian government showed its willingness to 

cooperate by passing a law on 17 May 1946 establishing a legal basis 

2 

for a program of economic warfare for the United Hations. 


1. CID #132661, 13 March 1945. 

2. OSS #68519; OSS source D, 10 July 1945. 

SECRET 









♦ ^ 



* * 









- 40 - 
1 

TABLE I 


SECRET 


ITALY*S ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIES WAR EFFORT IN MILLIONS 

OF U,S* DOUARS 

(Sept. 1943 - May 1946) 


Economlo Aasistance Rendered by Italy A 

Ao Goods and seralces paid with 

AMG lire 560 

B. Goods and services furnished 
by Italian citizens or by 
the Italian governinent with-. 
out payment by Allied authori¬ 


ties (requisitions): 

1, State railways 69 

2» Merchant marine (est) 80 

3. Allied naval repairs 

and transport of Allied 
personnel 15 

4. Buildings and industrial 

ostablishiaents (est) 100 

6« Miscellaneous 55 

C o Exports 21 


Totals , 900 

Italy*s Net Contribution 676 


2 

B Economic Assistance Received by Italy 


A. Civilian Sunplies 

300 

660 to Italy 


B. UNRRA supplies 

25 


69 

80 

16 

150 

106 

21 

1000 " 325 

676 


lo All these tables composed in collaboration v/ith FEAo 

2. Column A represents a conservative estimate. Column B a liberal estimate 
of Italy’s contributiono 


SECREJL 








4 


♦. • 


I • 









i_ 





» 11 


sncijsT 


TAiiL^ II 

ITALICS FIim^CLU. CONIRXBUTION TO IHE WM iiFFOET Di HIILLIC JS OP 

U«S, DOLLARS 

(Sept. 1943 - Doc. 1945) 


Financial Con1;rj, but ion by Italy Financial A ssi^r tance to I t aljy 


Ac Italy^s cont:tr?.bution as of 
1945 (o:3t) A 

910 

Ac 

Civilian supplies to Italy 300 

B« Italy’s contribution, Jime^ 
DTSceJiibar 1945 (oat) 

150 

Be 

UiJRRA supplios 

Total 

1,050 

Cc 

Appropriation on lend~ 
l -atKJ© budget 100 

isGB aselfitonco to Italy 

If©t Difference 

620 

430 

D, 

Hoiiabursoment for .AMG 

lire Mpssxt by Airerican 

troops In Italy ioO 


• 

Sc 

Post-liberation iccoimt 


(33Q.:>ort credits) 

Total 620 


Si:CHET 







i * 










« 42 - SECHE T 

TAi>LE III 

LIBERATED ITALY^S COKTRIBUTIOIT RELATED TO lATICKAL IHC-OMS IE 
MILLIONS Oif U.,Sc i>OLlAES. 

(Sspt, 1943 - May 1945) 

Southern Italy and Isleada Cc^ ntral Ital y 


P.ro-'Es.r a^unuai incoise 



1,080 

loss vra.r daatage (©st) 

500 


486 

Inoome after liberation (eat) 
lAcom©^ Sept,194S»May 1945 (est) 

1,000 

1„750 

(20 months) 

594 

400 (3 months) 

TOTAL Inoonis of Liberated Italy 
for War Period (ost) 




Italy's Not Contribution (©at) 

5?5 

or 2T;^ 



SECRET 







1 



y » 






» 

, ,pr '{^^:4■.■ 

y, ^ .lb. .-in y i;.4'* 

v^fV 


* . ,^r * . ■ •■’. r , .ii j‘ • u ^ • *■'■.*,' 

^iv v^'^:’- ■^- s. 

f .**;•. .^^ .A.vi,', -A...: ■ 4 I c^': ..- .V'. •; ;• - 

••f-’-^.’ fVv^*' -t,!' ^ ^ ^ 

■ '.ai'i *-. '>' \ r • '^ • * \ ^ '•• * y . j,’ * . •' ‘ 

^ ' • '» “• ■ ,,'!'« V • t • . '• ■ f ,«. ). > • ‘ » . ‘ ■ ** 


'^‘'. .V* ■'' /" ' ‘ . ■: ^ *-',v 

-»• f • 4 i*k^» A ^ ‘ '4 ^ • 1 *^ * •j 

V- •“ i .■ . i *• /•,' •- ■•' • r- ' C '• i: * . »•• •, ,' 

\’ I •' S *” ‘ .' A* ‘I '.'y'.*'^' ' • W4 • '/ •« ', ' , I,-* A 

■ ^ - .A;- ^ ,'V .'>• A \.; ": - , y" • V—:fi' - A,'V,^'* • .•^.-'V:: 

.'- ■' *'*■'• 1 ■ ' '■»*''' .*■•'. i ^' ‘ • •'•**^' 'V ' - * 

■ . ■ . 4 '.. v. ■ • -V : ,V •• / '•;; ‘ •-..•^^- : -...-^ 

- •. • ’ v^- ■ '•* ., /Xi^- ^ i. >- ‘.c V,v- ,- . ’-.V'V 

N ‘ .■;. ^.. ;-t ■.*.■ I’^(i , ••^. V* • :;■■ ■' • ■ v;,.-. ’ '. ■., 


i-.-'A ' ■.. . ".■ '«;i:-..v‘-v.^,-s .t',. 

-. i '‘ ,^ ^'.v, A ,v 4 i.' -ii' V ■ f-;,, : V'' vV-’ vv 

■-■, * ^•■.'•' '., V,..' S 

'•»,'. I >*T.-V V '• Vti., ^V>- .' ■« ,. -,' '-.V ,'.' 4 . 

■ , ,' '.^s:,.''-.^ • ■:.,■■ ■ ' •V-'' .S 

■ >'V .*-7 ■•. '.‘A • / ,• .•- .-•• v‘ »'■•’•• 

■":'. / .. ^ ■ ■' ^ '■: 

■ ■.'■'. ■'.'■■ 'V^.' 7 \ ■' A •,. 

■ ' ■ ,^ ' ■‘■'•a'' 4 ‘’^v '* 


■ ■.'■'. ■'.'■■ 'V^.' 7 \ ■' A •,. 

■ ' ■ ^ ' -iv« 

r .» ■* y • .» ^ • «■»•' ■ 4 '1 •, , ,• - 

- , - : ^ : ■ >:7 ' ‘v- •■■' ‘ 

. . A v-j >S: u :^‘\K ‘ 

••,.»■♦ • • •• / ..S' • J. ‘ /. C ••' 

' ■/ ■ ^:; ■ ■•'\ Y'\v 

'' -- • vVSv,./;^'.Ss-s v^. 

V V :v-..v' ■■' '■• ■■ ''v' ’Vv •s> v/vv 


’ ,'. ^.•y* ..> ’ ■' ''.‘V ' i ■ j'Vs-.sV' . '»'... ■' • * '. 

VV:iVx iV“V-^VS ^vv 

Mr ■ ■<-■ ?■ .'* A ■.. * ■ -'V v- ■■■ .:' ■ V :V ^ 4 , 

Pr ■"^ ■- ^A;^. • ■■■■:V V'. '■'' .V' ’:-': • 


/, 


t7^^' 


;^• . • 


>t ^• 


1 .■ 


•. 


V j' 


* '‘ •V 


. i'- /- ' ■’■/ ' t 'v’sv .■r\ 

' » , - ^ .. .-Y ' ■ ... -V -f ;.V .\-. 

V. ^ ■' 

•, ' •'■'■ A'^ ... ,-,.’ ■< ‘ 4': \ 

■ ■-■ '■ V;^A ■■;'s A .-i' ' 

t --'-' •k ' wV 'V . v,,'.*^ •’ • V:' 

' . ,. ■ •*•’ ’- . •• •. .•'• ‘ ’ vj. 'v :: 

i, t. * ' • ■ •,•«.»- '• ' . 4 ' A ^ 4 

■'.. vsv Y ' ■.•^■- •' ' ■" • . :-/• ■■ V -H*. 

■ V- - 

A .• • ' : • I • . ' . u-’ 4/ .. 


• •' ■.. -.' .... ‘ •''. :•.. “ ’ .. vsv V . ■ ■> ' L 

■■ ' ■' ■• \V.’- . v' ■ ; “ '.■■>. 

• ' ■ . f'-‘ 4 V . ^ •‘‘.y. • ;/ \ . •' .. < 4 . '' ■ * .- '' '*,*<4/ •" • ' ^ '' '*“ 4 

. ., .-> '• . ■ f *v* ■ ’•- '•* ""' ' ‘ ' •■ •.•..•.'•' "> i'^r 

■..'. ■' '•' , .-'.."A .S :.''V 

••• • • • '' .' * '*•' w '■ • • ,' \i‘ "' ’ ' ' ^ I’** . ■• • ' •. V. - * . 'J-' A ■ A »*-'■*' * * ^ jt • * rO Y 

; - ‘ ' ■ \ jr : '\v •>. •• • v .• y-.'.'. ir'*- ■-•. •■ ' •>.* .. \ 

■ ' ■ ■■■■'•..> V. -■■: -v'•.■'S -.'V-'' A , 'V v.a:VV^'. 

.‘"A: iSi ■■. vfI i|v'- ■"' ' ’ v • '• ' ■- *: '--4 iV'Vv* ’i -A ■' V '■ 

, ‘4 .':— .,V.-..A- v<x.:-A ■■ A-.,'..■.-AijjYVYY' ■^-V.-\fv J 

r < '4'' ‘ J : y^' 144 * ' // £ •. V li^ V . .' ■ . ■ *“ . '• .i •■■ ‘s i. 


.‘"A: iSi ■■. vfI i|v'- ■"' ' ’ v • '• ' ■- *: '--4 iV'Vv* ’i -A ■' V '■ 

• ' , -A V • Y*” * ■•■ ' ■ * '■ *k ’ 4->‘- * ^r- V , ,■• - '*^1 A ■ ' ••' ■ •■»■•“, ■•;. , -'- 'C’.J- .1 

, ‘Yv.'-- ••■-■■■;.•.,.; .,v.-..A... v> vYx .;-a ■' a-.,-..■.A ijjYYvY* ■^-v.-\fv 

K* • . . i*' '1 > .I.;,- Y -y * >• -. Vv - •' ' i 4 ,,. •*•. » . ^ ^ f. u V • 

m M -'-r ■* J, '• * Y' YY: s’ 'h> - .^YV • • ' 'iW.^X'- fy , 

Y''Y’^.V-YY’vYY- 4 'yYvYa ' 










Y* 


H 




i .■» 




Ji. A 




‘V 


-r-r; 












'i i 










▼V 




ifcf* • 








/Ai 


O^. ? 


k 




\Y 




vfi 


W 








*' •- . * ' 


<4 




r 


rv»; 




•‘•.'s'Ji 


-^ ■ . / .V V. 


A-< s I'Vk* 
















•k'-. 




SA 








> 


% 















































































































